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ONTOLOGICAL BELIEFS AND THEIR IMPACT 
ON TEACHING ELEMENTARY GEOMETRY 
Boris Girnat 
This paper proposes a conceptual framework to classify ontological be-
liefs on elementary geometry. As a first application, this framework is 
used to interpret nine interviews taken from secondary school teachers. 
The interpretation leads to the following results: (a) the ontological be-
liefs vary in a broad range, denying the assumption that a similar educa-
tion provokes analogue opinions; and (b) ontological beliefs have a re-
markable influence on the standards of proofs and on the 
epistemological status of theorems, and also on the role of drawing, con-
structions and their descriptions, media, and model building processes. 
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Creencias Ontológicas y su Impacto en la Enseñanza de la Geometría 
Elemental 
Este artículo propone un marco conceptual para clasificar las creencias 
ontológicas sobre la geometría elemental. Como primera aplicación, es-
te marco se utiliza para interpretar nueve entrevistas realizadas a profe-
sores de secundaria. La interpretación conduce a los siguientes resulta-
dos: (a) las creencias ontológicas varían en un amplio rango, negando 
la suposición de que una educación similar provoca opiniones análogas; 
y (b) las creencias ontológicas tienen una influencia notable en los es-
tándares de las pruebas y en el estatus epistemológico de los teoremas, 
así como en la función del dibujo, las construcciones y sus descripcio-
nes, los medios y los procesos de construcción de modelos. 
Términos clave: Creencias de los profesores; Educación secundaria; Geometría; 
Ontología  
In recent years, teachers’ beliefs have become a vivid exploratory focus of math-
ematics education (Calderhead, 1996). The main reason for this interest is the as-
sumption that “what teachers believe is a significant determiner of what gets 
thought, how it gets thought, and what gets learned in the classroom” (Wilson & 
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Cooney, 2002, p. 128). Following this idea, this article concerns the impact of 
ontological beliefs on teaching elementary geometry at secondary school. Espe-
cially, we consider their subtle influence on the modalities how geometrical is-
sues are thought, presented, and managed. 
A CLASSIFICATION OF ONTOLOGICAL BELIEFS 
ON GEOMETRY 
The ontological background of a theory can be described as the answer to the fol-
lowing questions: To what kind of objects does the theory refer and what are the 
basic assumptions the theory claims upon these objects? Insofar, ontology is split 
into a referential and a theoretical aspect. This idea can be specified on the base 
of a particular kind of philosophy of science which is called the structuralist the-
ory of science, primarily established by Sneed (1979) and elaborated by Stegmül-
ler (1985). To establish our classification of ontological beliefs, we will combine 
this approach with an investigation of Struve (1990), who adopted this theory to 
mathematics education to analyse the influence of textbooks. As a further source, 
the concept of geometrical working spaces is used, which was developed to clas-
sify students’ handling of geometrical problems (Houdement & Kuzniak, 2001). 
Following the structuralist theory of science, we assume that a non-trivial 
(more or less scientific) theory can be described by two components, namely by 
its system of axioms and by a set of intended applications (Stegmüller, 1985). By 
the set of axioms, the conceptual and propositional content of a theory is given; 
and by the set of intended applications, the referential aspect of the theory is de-
termined. In the case of elementary geometry, the set of axioms normally corre-
sponds to an axiomatization of classical Euclidean geometry. Concerning the set 
of intended applications, already in history of mathematics, its content was con-
troversial. We will distinguish between three influential opinions, which seem to 
cover the whole range of geometrical ontology (Kline, 1983):  
! In a formalistic view, geometry is seen as an uninterpreted calculus with-
out any reference, that is, the set of intended application is regarded as 
empty.  
! In an idealistic view, geometry refers to a world of ideal objects which 
fulfils the Euclidean axioms without any approximation and which do not 
belong to the physical world.  
! In an applied view, geometry refers to physical objects, typically with 
some approximation. At school, the paradigmatic real-world objects ele-
mentary geometry is applied to are drawing figures, figures produced by 
Interactive Geometry Software (IGS), and physical objects of middle di-
mension like balls, dice, chambers, ladders, bridges, and churches —
especially the ornaments of their windows—. 
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By this threefold distinction, the first step of our classification is given. It is only 
defined by a difference in the set of intended applications, taken a complete Eu-
clidean geometry as a theoretical background for granted. To analyze teachers’ or 
students’ beliefs, this assumption is inappropriate, since their geometrical propo-
sitions may differ from the standards of an axiomatic Euclidean geometry. For 
this reason, we introduce a second distinction on the theoretical level, insofar as 
we discriminate between an axiomatic Euclidean theory and an empirical one. In 
the first case, the individual theory follows the mathematical standards of an axi-
omatic elementary geometry —possibly except some minor mistakes due to hu-
man fallibility—; in the latter case, the individual theory lacks these standards 
significantly and consists of geometrical assumptions which substantially differ 
from a scientific view and which may be at most locally ordered, fulfilling the 
inferential standards of everyday discussions. 
For our investigation, it is not necessary to describe the differences in the 
content of an individual empirical theory of geometry and a Euclidean one. We 
are rather interested in the question how the ontological difference influences the 
way of treating geometry on a meta-level, which we have initially circumscribed 
by keywords like standards of proving, presenting objects, or applying geometry. 
We claim that the differences on this meta-level are independent from the specif-
ic content of an empirical theory and only determined by its status as an empiri-
cal one. The main influence on these issues is already indicated by choosing the 
expression “empirical theory” for theories which do not fulfil axiomatic stand-
ards. Due to the lack of an elaborated axiomatic background, these theories can-
not be treated in a formalistic or idealistic manner, since they afford neither a co-
herent calculus nor the conceptual strength to describe a world of idealistic 
objects sufficiently. Therefore, theories like these have to be regarded as empiri-
cal ones, which can only be denoted as geometrical, since they share the same set 
of intended applications with an applied Euclidean geometry and since they are 
used for similar purposes —for instance for measurement, for calculating 
lengths, angles, and areas or for formulating general theorems containing com-
mon geometrical concepts—. To distinguish between these two types, we will 
call an applied geometry which is intended to have a complete axiomatic Euclid-
ean background a rationalistic geometry and an empirical geometry without such 
a background an empiristic geometry. This is the second distinction of our classi-
fication. Figure 1 gives a complete overview. 
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Table 1  
Ontological Influences on Geometry 
Formalistic 
geometry 
Idealistic 
geometry 
Rationalistic 
geometry 
Empiristic 
geometry 
Methods of proof and sources of knowledge 
Purely deductive, 
linked to axioms 
Purely deductive, 
linked to axioms 
Purely deductive, 
linked to axioms 
Inferential 
arguments, 
experiments, 
intuitions 
Role of experience, experiments, and measurement 
Heuristic Heuristic Heuristic and to 
identify 
geometrical 
objects 
Basis of 
knowledge 
Status of drawing 
Heuristic Heuristic An application of 
geometry 
Objects of study 
and validation 
Access to objects 
By relational or 
constructive 
descriptions 
By relational or 
constructive 
descriptions 
By experience and 
measurement 
By experience and 
measurement 
Experience 
Linked to a 
formal concept of 
space 
Linked to an 
abstract Euclidean 
space 
Linked to 
physical space, 
interpreted in 
Euclidean 
concepts 
Linked to the 
measurable 
physical space 
without a 
predefined 
geometrical 
interpretation 
Objects of intuition 
Internal to 
mathematics 
Linked to 
idealistic figures 
Linked to 
idealized real 
figures 
Linked to 
perceptions 
It is claimed that the content of Table 1 is a logical consequence of the different 
types of geometrical ontology; that is, the table is guided by the assumption that 
if someone possesses the ontological background mentioned in the sub-header of 
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the table, it will be rational for him —and from an empirical point of view ex-
pectable— also to hold the statements in the below row. If this assumption is 
empirically traceable is one of our further tasks. 
TEACHERS’ ONTOLOGICAL BELIEFS ON GEOMETRY 
Students’ ontological beliefs on geometry are extensively investigated by two 
studies (Andelfinger, 1988; Struve, 1990). In our terms, they both end up in the 
result that students gain an empiristic view, assuming that the ontological back-
ground of teachers is a formalistic or idealistic one. In this article, the presuppo-
sition that teachers form a unified community of formalists and idealists is taken 
into question. 
The empirical base of our investigation consists of semi-structured inter-
views taken from nine teachers of mathematics who are employed at German 
higher level secondary schools (so-called Gymnasien) and who teach mathemat-
ics from grade 7 to 13; that means that the age of their students ranges from 12 to 
19 years. We refer to the teachers by the letters A to I. The aim of our whole in-
vestigation consists in the task of reconstructing the teachers’ individual curricula 
of teaching geometry as subjective theories (Eichler, 2006). For this article, the 
results are restricted to ontological aspects. Subjective theories are defined as 
systems of cognitions containing a rationale which is, at least, implicit (Groeben, 
Wahl, Schlee, & Scheele, 1988). For this reason, the construct of subjective theo-
ries is a tool to reveal logical dependencies within the belief system of an indi-
vidual. In our case, we are focussed on the dependencies between general onto-
logical assumptions and the specific handling of geometry, guided by the 
following questions:  
1. What types of ontological backgrounds occur according to our classification?  
2. Do they lead to the consequences which are to be expected (see Table 1)?  
3. Are there unexpected influences which do not seem to be accidental, but also 
implications of the ontological background? 
Following our first question, we can conclude that every type of ontological 
background occur in our sampling. Our interpretation leads to the following clas-
sification (see Table 2). 
Table 2  
Ontological Classification of Teacher A to I 
  Ontological background 
Formalist  Idealist  Rationalist  Empirist 
Teacher  A, I  B, D, F  C, G  E, H 
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We present here a single case study per category, and we restrict the empirical 
base to one significant phrase —all transcripts are translated by the author—. Mr. 
A’s ontological background is a clearly formalistic one. He regrets that time lim-
its him to implement it extensively: 
Interviewer: What do you think of formalism in mathematics? 
Mr. A: I loved it at university. It is pure reasoning… I would like to do 
such a thing [at school], but that is difficult, since I only teach 
four lessons a week… Five years back, when I had five lessons to 
teach, I did it and I did it gladly. 
Mrs. D’s answer provides an example of an idealistic view: 
Mrs. D: The beauty of mathematics is the fact that everything there is log-
ical and dignified… Everywhere else, there are mistakes and ap-
proximations, but not in mathematics. There is everything in a 
status in which it ideally has to be. [It is important] to recognize 
that there are ideal things and objects in mathematics and that, in 
reality, they are similar, but not equal. 
It is interesting to note the subtle difference between Mrs. D and Mr. C below. 
Whereas Mrs. D stresses that mathematical objects are ideal and do not occur in 
reality, Mr. C refers to physical objects by geometrical terms without doubts, but 
emphasizes that some kind of abstraction is necessary, which indicates that he 
holds a rationalistic view of geometry, and not a empiristic one: 
Mr. C: I make them [the students] search for shapes in reality and to pre-
scind from them. Then this cone is a steeple or an ice-cream cor-
net… There are some basic shapes which are consistently occur-
ring in life. 
Since the difference between a rationalist and an empirist does not arise from a 
referential disagreement —they both refer to physical objects—, we omit a quo-
tation concerning this issue and present two key phrases which show that this dif-
ference depends on the status of the geometrical theory: 
Interviewer: What do you say if a student claims that he can see that some-
thing is as it is? Do you insist on a proof? 
Mr. C: As far as classical proofs are concerned, I think: Yes, I do. If 
someone asserted in case of the Pythagorean theorem “By meas-
uring, the theorem holds”, then something of value would disap-
pear… something which is genuinely mathematical… If geome-
try just consisted of measurement, calculation, drawing, and 
constructing, then I would regard it as meagre. 
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In the context of IGS and congruence, Mr. H refers to proofs. It is obvious that 
he allows experience and measurement to be bearers of knowledge. Insofar, he 
holds an empiristic view of geometry. 
Interviewer: What is your experience with interactive geometry software? 
Mr. H: It is possible to demonstrate and to prove many things by such 
software, for example Thales’ theorem. We move the third point 
of the triangle on the arc of the circle and observe that it [the an-
gle] always equals 90°, and we take this as a proof… All triangles 
are cut out and laid on top of another, and we observe that they 
are all equal… and we achieve the insight that three attributes are 
sufficient to construct the same triangle… Thereby, the concept 
of congruence is given. What does congruence mean? That means 
that something can be laid on something different without over-
laps… We introduce ! by measuring the circumferences of cir-
cles… That is more exact and more concrete for the students as if 
we went from a quadrangle to a pentagon, to a hexagon…, and 
sometime, we get an infinitygon, which we call a circle. [Using 
the latter method,] the aberrations are significant at the beginning, 
and it is difficult to draw a triacontagon… So, it is worth to ask if 
this method makes sense, since for students, it will be important 
to solve specific things. That won’t have to be exact. 
At a first result, we can conclude that the ontological beliefs of teachers are more 
divers than assumed by Struve (1990) and Andelfinger (1988). Especially, even 
the empiristic type which is supposed to be limited to students occurs twice in a 
sampling of nine individuals. It would be interesting, if a quantitative investiga-
tion could confirm this remarkable percentage. The claims in Table 1 are empiri-
cally detectable. Here we tried to choose quotations which make our assumption 
plausible and which should have shown that the ontological background is the 
crucial influence on the epistemological status of geometric theorems and, there-
fore, on the role of experience and measurement. 
FURTHER INFLUENCES 
The first part of our investigation was guided by a pre-defined hypothesis. Al-
ready in the quotations above, it is noticeable that ontological beliefs have an un-
expected impact on further aspects of teaching geometry. For instance, Mr. H’s 
students would presumably gain a physically defined notion of congruence and 
approximation and no elaborated concept of limits and irrational numbers. Unex-
pected impacts leads to theory construction. We will present our results in Table 
3, not being able to establish our claims in detail. Instead, we will quote some 
unconnected episodes taken from different positions of our interviews to make 
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our deliberations plausible and to consider the differences between a formalistic 
and idealistic view, which was of minor interest until now —arguing for the as-
sumption that a community of idealists and formalist is a fiction—. 
Table 3 
Assumptions on the Ontological Impact on Aspects of Teaching Geometry 
Formalistic 
geometry 
Idealistic 
geometry 
Rationalistic 
geometry 
Empiristic 
geometry 
Purpose of proofs 
Verify the truth, 
reveal logical 
dependencies 
Verify the truth, 
tools to remember 
content 
Verify the truth Make the truth of 
a sentence 
plausible 
Objects to prove 
General theorems General theorems, 
attributes of 
objects 
General theorems Unclear 
Didactic aims of proving 
Argumentative 
abilities, insights 
in the nature of 
mathematics 
Argumentative 
abilities, insights 
in the nature of 
mathematics 
Argumentative 
abilities, insights 
in the nature of 
mathematics 
Of minor interest 
Content of school mathematics 
Of minor 
importance, 
exchangeable in 
principle 
Important entity to 
learn, large 
amount desirable 
Important entity to 
learn, medium 
amount desirable 
Is to restrict to 
practically useful 
topics 
Object studies 
Of minor, only 
didactic interest 
Important task, no 
physical objects 
allowed 
To learn the 
approximative use 
of geometrical 
concepts in real 
world situations 
To achieve 
knowledge by 
experience 
Type of definitions 
According logical 
standards 
According logical 
standards 
According logical 
standards 
Derived from 
experience 
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Table 3 
Assumptions on the Ontological Impact on Aspects of Teaching Geometry 
Formalistic 
geometry 
Idealistic 
geometry 
Rationalistic 
geometry 
Empiristic 
geometry 
Purpose of theories and axiomatization 
Objects of study 
and objects to 
achieve deductive 
abilities 
Tools to describe 
mathematical 
objects, different 
approaches 
desirable 
Tools to describe 
mathematical 
objects, of 
medium interest 
Of minor interest, 
possibly as a tool 
to solve practical 
problems 
Influence of IGS 
Decreases the 
insight in the 
necessity of 
proving 
Allows complex 
constructions, 
identifies 
(in)adequate 
constructions 
Identifies 
(in)adequate 
constructions 
Additional source 
of mathematical 
knowledge, 
introduces 
motional aspects 
Role of construction descriptions 
Of minor interest Most important 
way to access 
objects 
Of minor interest Obsolete 
Model building processes 
Motivation, 
occasions to learn 
further 
argumentative 
abilities 
Contains an 
“unmathematical” 
way of thinking, 
didactical tool 
Contains an 
“unmathematical” 
way of thinking 
Important 
justification of 
teaching 
mathematics 
Problem solving 
Train 
argumentative 
abilities 
To train 
argumentative 
abilities 
To train 
argumentative 
abilities 
To link to real-
world problems 
Role of algorithms 
Tools and objects 
to justify 
Tools and objects 
to justify 
Tools and objects 
to justify 
Tools 
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We observe remarkable differences between a typical formalist and a typical ide-
alist in matters of content, axiomatization, constructions, model building, and 
IGS. 
Mr. A: It doesn’t matter what content we teach. The most important thing is 
that it is mathematics. The essence of mathematics can be found in 
every part of it: this consistency… The necessity of proof is reduced 
by IGS, since there are always 90° [in case of Thales’ theorem…] I 
want that students solve complex problems in larger contexts… and 
that they justify algorithms… Concerning analysis and probability the-
ory, there are many things which cannot be proved [at school], and in 
geometry, I don’t see this at all… Arguing, thinking in conceptual hi-
erarchies, problem solving, and model building —these are the higher 
goals in my view—. 
Mr. B: On the way from a real situation to a mathematical model,… an argu-
mentation arises which was untypical for teaching mathematics until 
now… I regard problem solving as a very important part of geome-
try,… whereas describing the real world is not in the first place… 
There are some very challenging constructions, but with IGS, there is 
no problem… In an optimistic view, I expect that, after school, a stu-
dent copes with the complete mathematical contents and methods of 
secondary school. 
This summarization of short episodes may illustrate why we have chosen the top-
ics and assumptions mentioned in Table 3. From a meta-level, the differences be-
tween formalists and idealists seem to arise from the ontological attitude that an 
idealist is more interested in (idealistic) objects and their properties and construc-
tions, whereas a formalist stresses theories, conception, and deductions, which 
opens an access to general abilities in the field of argumentations, problem solv-
ing, and model building. 
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